U.K. Crisis Spills Into U.S. Junk Debt

kate930

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(Via The Wall Street Journal) -- U.K. Crisis Spills Into U.S. Junk Debt
  • Collateralized loan obligation prices have been hit hard by a slump in the British pound and the unwinding of U.K. pension investments
  • Weakness in the CLO market may also have a knock-on effect on leveraged buyouts, including the financing for Elon Musk’s planned purchase of Twitter.
Fallout from the crisis in U.K. financial markets has hit a faraway corner of Wall Street: the trillion-dollar market for collateralized loan obligations.

Once a niche product, CLOs are now widely held by investors around the world, including the British pensions, insurers and funds that got caught by the recent crash in U.K. currency and government-bond markets. Many of them sold CLO bonds to meet margin calls, sending prices of the securities tumbling well below their intrinsic value, analysts and fund managers said.

Some U.S. investment funds rushed to snap up the bonds at what they considered incredible bargains.

“It was the heaviest selling pressure we’ve ever seen,” said Tom Majewski, a managing partner at Eagle Point Credit Management, a Greenwich, Conn.-based investment firm specializing in CLOs. Eagle Point purchased about $80 million of CLO securities in the seven trading days ended Oct. 5, double the amount it would normally buy in a seven-day period, he said.

In recent weeks, trading of the CLO bonds most commonly held by pensions and insurers hit its highest level since March and April of 2020, according to analysis by The Wall Street Journal of trading data reported to a U.S. regulator. CLO prices stabilized last week after falling to their lowest level since mid-2020, but the selling continued unabated. Average daily trading in the first week of October was around $1 billion, twice the daily average over the past 12 months, according to analysis by the Journal.

The surge of activity took place while global markets—with the exception of the U.K.—were far calmer than at the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The S&P 500 lost 7% in the past three weeks, compared with 16% in March 2020.

Rising turmoil in CLOs shows how fluctuations of normally placid interest rates in developed economies are rattling financial markets in unexpected ways. Forced selling by U.K. investors has also hit corporate bonds, stocks, mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities, investors and analysts said.

CLOs are a sliver of assets held by U.K. pension funds that try to guard against changes in interest rates through so-called liability-driven investment strategies. Con Keating, head of research at Brighton Rock Group, said he estimated them to be a maximum of 5% of assets under management.

Pensions and others had invested £1.6 trillion ($1.8 trillion) in LDIs by 2021, data from trade group The Investment Association show. In the relatively small market for CLOs, sales a percentage of that size have the ability to shift prices, unlike in larger markets for government bonds and stocks.

Weakness in the CLO market may also have a knock-on effect on leveraged buyouts—a lucrative business for Wall Street—because the investment vehicles purchase about 60% of the loans backing the deals.

CLOs are investment vehicles primarily run by alternative-asset managers like Blackstone Inc. and Carlyle Group Inc. The firms sell bonds and stocks to outside investors, then use the money to buy junk-rated corporate loans, which pay interest that is redistributed to holders of the CLO bonds and shares. Investors piled into CLOs over the past decade, sparking worry of excessive risk taking, but they held up in the 2020 market panic, making them even more popular.

Most CLOs issue bonds of different rank: Those with triple-A credit ratings get paid first, while junior bonds rated as low as double-B wait in line to receive payment. Insurers and pensions favor the higher-ranked CLO bonds because their credit ratings satisfy regulatory guidelines and because they pay higher yields than corporate and mortgage bonds with comparable investment-grade ratings.

Heavy selling of CLOs started the week ended Sept. 23, when the pound hit a 37-year low, forcing U.K. investors that use derivatives to hedge foreign-exchange risk to sell assets to cover losses, said Wayne Dahl, a managing director at Los Angeles-based Oaktree Capital. The deluge intensified the following week, when prices of U.K. government bonds tumbled, triggering margin calls on LDIs, held by pension funds.

“That generated a ton of emails internally,” Mr. Dahl said. “We’ve definitely been buyers.”

About $13 billion of investment-grade CLO bond trades were reported in the U.S. during the past three weeks, according to analysis by the Journal of a database maintained by Interactive Data Corp. and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. That is the highest volume since a three-week stretch in March and April 2020 when about $15 billion changed hands.

CLO prices have dropped to their lowest levels since May of 2020, according to an index of the securities operated by Palmer Square Capital Management. The firm’s investment-grade CLO bond index traded at 88.7 last week, down 4% since the start of September.

Some bond prices slipped even further, particularly those of European CLOs that were heavily owned by U.K. investors. The double-A-rated bond of a euro-denominated CLO managed by Investcorp Credit Management dropped about 5% in late September to roughly 90 cents on the dollar, according to data from KopenTech LLC. A spokeswoman for Investcorp declined to comment.

Falling CLO bond prices make it more expensive for CLO managers to borrow money to launch investment pools, reducing new issuance. Fewer new CLOs means fewer buyers for the “leveraged loans” investment banks sell to help private-equity firms fund their takeovers at a time when debt investors are already worried about a potential recession.

Banks that financed Vista Equity Partners and Elliott Management Corp.’s $16.5 billion buyout of Citrix Systems took a roughly $500 million loss on related loans sold in September amid weak investor demand. The market will face an even bigger test when banks try to place $6.5 billion of loans for Elon Musk’s planned $44 billion purchase of Twitter Inc.

“From a CLO manager’s perspective, the selloff isn’t helpful,” said Lauren Basmadjian, a partner at the Carlyle Group, one of the world’s largest CLO operators. “What our market needs is stability to issue CLOs.”

But Carlyle also invests in CLO bonds and from that standpoint, the forced selling by U.K. institutions is a windfall, Ms. Basmadjian said: “We’ve definitely been adding exposure over the last month.”
 
@kate930 TLDR : Pound crisis caused UK pension funds to sell off high yield primarily-US based corporate debt to meet margin calls (classic crunch). Large selling pressure was mostly absorbed by still high dry powder in US asset managers who snapped up an easy arb. Knock on effects of continued CLO selling could make LBOs more expensive (as they’re financed with high yield)

Opinion: this stuff barely trades. It’s used as a middle tranche of risk by large asset managers. $13bn of transactions in a week is absolutely minuscule. This is a story made to feel like 2008, but it’s not even close.
 
@crazytimesman this. people hear CLO and they get terrified, i would only add almost all the UK pension CLO selling was AAA rated CLOs, and even less liquid market controlled by like 8 players.
 
@crazytimesman Every liquidity crisis is different so why do we always think that to have a recession the liquidity crisis has to look exactly like the last one.

In the end it’s a very good article with lots of useful info but it seems to miss the bigger picture that the dollar is becoming stronger and is viewed as more stable during a credit and liquidity crisis where the real crunch is being caused by a shortage of dollars or dollar backed securities to shore up these margin requirements. That further strengthens the dollar against a basket of currencies further driving this inequality and driving up margin requirements even further. This is the powder keg that could possibly set off a further recession and the BoE intervening 3 times in two weeks is worrisome
 
@crazytimesman My confusion is why pensions with such short investment horizon, buy liability driven investments? Are they trying to gain an edge by offering better yields? Doesn’t make sense to me.
 
@apsseeker These are pension FUNDS

They don't really have short investment horizons as they do continuous liabilities.

It's not the same as your investments that are going to be needed within a finite window.

These funds are essentially looking to maximize stable returns over a perpetual time window.
 
@apsseeker pensions don't have a short investment horizon. fundamentally, they're long-dated (e.g., 30+ years). beneficiaries can't just request their money out of a pension vs. e.g., a mutual fund or something.

a simple investment strategy for a pension would be 100% government bonds, targeting whatever amount of money they need in ~30 years and working backward to today via the prevailing yield to figure out the total outlay (i.e., if they need $1bn in 30 years, and 30-year is paying 2.5%, buying $480mm of bonds today).

the problem with this approach is that it is expensive (given low prevailing yields) and so typically pensions invest in a mix of less-risky government bonds and riskier assets like stocks (or even alternatives). and pensions are happy to do this because they are better able to withstand price shocks given their longer-dated liability/investment horizon (that is to say, they are not vulnerable to runs unlike e.g., mutual funds).

where this gets wonky is, from an accounting standpoint, any underfunded pension with a non-zero mix of risky assets (i.e., not just government bonds) – which is to say, virtually all pensions – is essentially short government bonds. because the disproportionate present value accounting of a pension's assets vs. obligations (due to portfolio being a mix of gov bonds and risky assets), any change in the interest rate will impact the pension balance sheet as if it were short government bonds (i.e., decline in rates/appreciation in price of gov bonds will increase liabilities more than assets meaning it will be more underfunded).

now this shouldn't really matter fundamentally (since it's kind of just an accounting quirk) except for pension managers have to explain this to their bosses and pensions are subject to regulatory oversight (e.g., a severely underfunded pension would be subject to a regulator stepping in).

one way to mitigate this issue, which is by and large what is hurting uk pensions now, is to basically go long government bonds in a levered way, so instead of a portfolio being just $240mm of government bonds and $50mm stocks, they also borrow another $240mm and put that in government bonds too (such that you are hedged to any rate changes).

the problem here now is that you are using short duration liabilities to buy risky assets, essentially taking away the key long-dated feature of the pension (such that you are now exposed to a potential run a la a bank, mutual fund, etc.) since a rate rise will necessitate posting additional collateral with whatever institution you've borrowed the $240mm from to fund the additional gov bond purchases.
 
@crazytimesman ....yet

Edit: I'm just saying I'm not yet ready to catch the falling knife yet hahaha. Same news about interest rates, Russia, inflation every day. I've got one eye on the US China relationship explicitly deteriorating, what is that panic going to look like if that economic cold war gets hotter?
 
@reactcoder Really dude? I guess you’re allocating a ton of your dry powder to private TLB debt? That you can’t say trade? Because you sort of strike me as one of the types that treats the NYSE like a casino…
 
@alwayshavealwayswill No no, it was just a little joke, "yet" intended as a follow-up to the comment that it isn't 2008. I'm joking about the potential outcome being a substantial recession. Not commenting on the particulars on OPs analysis.
 
@foxyroxy I guess that’s the big difficulty with investing, right? what worked in the past won’t necessarily work in the future.

Kind on makes me kind of nervous about the Fed’s doctrinal insistance on rate hikes, now that I think about it. Hope they can still recognize if their strategy doesn’t work out.
 
@scumyetservant So anyone here feel free to correct me if I'm wrong but I think this was the situation.

Let's say in order to meet obligations the pension determines it needs a return of 6% on its bond investments. Now this worked historically when rates were higher but as rates fell the pension started to fall behind on its returns in order to meet its obligations.

Now let's say that the bonds yield 3% and the pension needs 6% in order to meet its obligations what does it do? It can ask pensioners to contribute more, in order to buy more bonds, it can tell pensioners their benefits will be decreased, OR it can leverage the existing bonds it has, borrow money and buy more bonds.

So in a simple example bonds are $100 and yield 3% however the fund needs 6%. So in order to meet that they borrow another $100 using the original bond as collateral, and just double up and buy another bond with the borrowed cash, bringing a 6% return on $100 initial capital. Albeit now with a $100 debt obligation that is currently the problem when its margin called and causes a snowball effect as the pension funds are not diversified.

Edit: This is just my best guess and simplified example. I’m an amateur
 
@resjudicata Totally agree, how are pension funds going to meet their obligations with bond yields near zero as they have been recently? Of course they're going to reach for leverage. Super-low interest rates have pushed everyone towards a riskier and riskier allocation to find yield.
 

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